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ABSTRACT
Fast data rates and complicated protocols have outpaced network intrusion
detection systems. Administrators are forced to choose between breadth
and depth: systems either deeply analyze traffic for a small handful of
vulnerabilities, or search for many in parallel using more primitive (and
easily evadable) techniques. We present a new parser architecture called
VESPA, which uses the concept of vulnerability signatures to offer both
speed and accuracy. VESPA is informed by a study of network protocols,
which precedes the design. We conclude by reviewing several trends in
computer architecture, and their impact on future intrusion detection
systems. We believe a system which offers both speed and accuracy is
possible, but requires rethinking how network intrusion detectors are
designed, in light of trends in computer architecture.
ii
To Stephanie and Steve, for convincing me to start,
To John, Nikhil, and my research group—Nikita, Prateek, Nabil, Robin,
Amir, and Shishir—for showing me the way,
And Kate, for helping me to finish.
iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Chapter 4 is derived from “High-speed matching of vulnerability
signatures,” work previously published at the 2008 Recent Advances in
Intrusion Detection Symposium. The work was co-authored with Nabil
Schear and Nikita Borisov. Apart from the noted exception, this thesis is
original work of the author. It has not been published or used previously
for any purpose.
This work was supported by NSF grant CNS 06-27671.
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1 Pattern Matching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2 Protocols, and Protocol Parser Generators . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.3 Software Intrusion Detection Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.4 Hardware Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.5 Classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
CHAPTER 3 NETWORK PROTOCOLS AND SOFTWARE VUL-
NERABILITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.1 Protocol Archetypes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.2 Vulnerabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.3 Forward . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
CHAPTER 4 VESPA: THE VULNERABILITY SIGNATURE PAR-
SER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.2 Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
CHAPTER 5 SYSTEMS ISSUES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
5.1 Sensitivity Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
5.2 The Hardware Mismatch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
CHAPTER 6 FUTURE DIRECTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
6.1 Future Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
6.2 Other Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
v
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In the past decade, the Internet has become mission-critical. Once
peripheral to other communication systems, today the Internet is used to
execute financial transactions, control utility infrastructure, and even serve
court summons [1], [2]. Given the network’s centrality to its users’ personal
and professional lives, service interruptions are quite disruptive. In 2007,
the Estonian government became a victim of cyberterrorism when a
distributed denial of service attack disabled access to several of its web sites
for several hours [3].
Despite the high cost of disruptions, software vulnerabilities persist.
Code and protocol defects in operating systems, servers, and recently, client
applications (e.g. web browsers [4]) offer plenty of opportunities for misuse.
Combined with fast, anonymous broadband access, vulnerabilities in
network-facing code have created an extremely challenging threat landscape
[5].
The need for systems that detect and respond to misuse—network
intrusion detection systems (NIDS)—is greater than ever, yet existing
systems have not kept up. IT organizations with big budgets have made
some headway using expensive commercial solutions; those with fewer
resources sacrifice detection accuracy to keep up with the incoming traffic
stream.
Setting out, we wanted to know whether a NIDS could be built on
commodity hardware while still offering reasonable performance. Ideally,
the system would offer full understanding of protocol semantics, and be
capable of operation at around 1 Gbps. After a year and a half of research
and study, we believe such a system is possible, but it requires rethinking
how to construct a NIDS.
We begin by characterizing the NIDS workload with a detailed study of
network protocols. We continue with experiments on protocol parsing,
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which demonstrate that today’s systems leave significant performance on
the table in the name of usability and object-orientation. Finally, we
describe why current designs are misaligned with fundamental trends in
computer architecture.
This work focuses on signature-based intrusion detection systems
positioned at an enterprise ingress/egress point. We do not study
anomaly-based systems or positioning a NIDS at another point in the
topology, although in principle our insights should apply to both of these
scenarios.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
NIDS design is an exercise in systems engineering. The system must
reconstruct the flow of incoming data, convert the stream of bytes into
protocol events, and apply policy to the traffic. With so many related
concerns, the scope of NIDS literature is large.
2.1 Pattern Matching
Pattern matching is a key building block of NIDS. High-speed pattern
matching is especially important, as we want to design a system that
operates at 1 Gbps.
NIDS use substring search (the most primitive search operation) to
locate static strings in network data. The most naive algorithm,
compare-and-backtrack, is the slowest. Compare-and-backtrack requires no
preprocessing, but this is not a major advantage as signature-based NIDSes
use a static pattern set. Knuth-Morris-Pratt [6] does better than
compare-and-backtrak by precomputing a “partial match table,” which
avoids full backtracking. The Aho-Corasick algorithm [7] goes further by
searching for a multi-element “dictionary” of strings in a single, linear-time
pass of the text. Boyer-Moore [8] also offers linear-time search, but its
runtime is scaled by 1
m
, where m is the length of the pattern to match. Wu
and Manber’s “fuzzy string search” [9] offers the ability to find
“approximate” matches (based on Levenshtein distance [10]) of a string
within a corpus of text.
Beyond static strings, regular languages define a set (possibly infinite) of
patterns to match.1 The set of patterns is called a regular language, and is
1While the number of strings in a regular language is potentially infinite, the number of
states in the corresponding automaton is necessarily finite. Consider the regular expression
which matches all strings: its automaton contains a single “accept” state, but it matches
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specified by a regular expression. Finite automata recognize membership in
a regular language; given a regular language, constructing an automaton to
recognize it is trivial, from the correctness standpoint. However, the
technique used to construct the automaton affects its performance
characteristics. “Nondeterministic” constructions (e.g. pcre [11]) attempt
to find a path through the automaton by backing out when they hit a
“dead end.” The nondeterministic approach requires a modest amount of
memory, but can suffer from long runtimes if excessive backtracking occurs.
“Deterministic” approaches (e.g. flex [12]), on the other hand, generate a
new machine with a state corresponding to every member of the power set
of the nondeterministic machine’s states. Deterministic matchers linearly
bound runtime (they never backtrack), but have huge memory
requirements—potentially exponential in the nondeterministic machine’s
number of states.
Context-free languages generalize regular expressions with production
rules. Our study of network traffic (protocols and vulnerabilities) revealed
few, if any, protocol structures that mapped naturally to context-free
languages (Pang et al. [13]). Context-sensitive languages offer the most
general pattern recognition, but recognizing them lacks the computational
boundedness of context-free languages, which limits their usefulness in IDS.2
Some nontraditional approaches increase performance by exploiting
particular characteristics of the NIDS workload. Smith et al. attempted to
combine the advantages of deterministic and nondeterministic matching
using Extended Finite Automata [14]. Rubin et al. developed
protomatching to heuristically reduce matching complexity by discarding
non-matching packets as quickly as possible, while keeping a low memory
footprint [15]. Hardware-based approaches offer high-speed matching using
custom hardware; Section 2.4.1 explores this further.
an infinite number of strings.
2As an aside, we note that language complexity is, at best, a rough indicator of hardware
complexity; the fact that a traffic pattern is expressable as a regular language in no way
implies its ease of recognition, relative to a context-free language.
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2.2 Protocols, and Protocol Parser Generators
Similar to yacc/bison [16], [17], protocol parser generators automatically
generate protocol parsers from declarative grammars. Protocol parser
generators augment the functionality of basic parser generators with
features useful for parsing network data: automatic reordering of multibyte
fields, state checkpointing, etc.
The “Generic Application-Layer Protocol Analyzer” [18] was the first of
at least two major efforts to produce a protocol parser generator. GAPA
offers a type-safe, declarative language called GAPAL, in which users
declare protocol grammar. From the GAPAL specification, GAPA generates
a recursive-descent parser to consume protocol data, which runs as a
layered service provider in the Windows Sockets (Winsock) stack. GAPA’s
strong type-safety hardens generated parsers against exploitation, but the
reference implementation achieved an overall throughput of only 11.7 Mbps
on moderately powerful hardware.3 GAPA’s performance is adequate for
end-host protocol parsing, but unsuitable for bulk (in-network) analysis.
Binpac, a project similar to GAPA, also generates network protocol
parsers [13]. However, the binpac authors elected to sacrifice GAPA’s
strong safety for improved performance. Rather than targeting compilation
to an interpreted environment, binpac emits native C++ code suitable for
bulk monitoring and analysis applications. Binpac is used as the standard
protocol parser in the Bro Intrusion Detection System [19].
The VESPA project [20] offers a third alternative for generating protocol
parsers. The VESPA authors noted that intrusion detection policies often
rely on a limited subset of protocol fields, even though most designs
unconditionally parse all fields. By performing parsing in a policy-aware
way, the system realizes order-of-magnitude speedups in some protocols.
VESPA is explained in detail in Chapter 4.
2.3 Software Intrusion Detection Systems
Both commercial vendors and free/open-source groups (FOSS) have
developed software-based NIDS. Snort [21] and Bro [19] have received the
3A Windows XP machine with a 3 GHz CPU and 1 GB of RAM.
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lion’s share of attention in the literature; both feature wide deployment,
and freely available codebases.
Bro has been under development by researchers at Lawrence Berkeley
National Laboratory and the International Computer Science Institute
several years before a paper describing the system was published in 1998
[19]. Bro features a modular, object-oriented construction designed for
in-network (cf. host-based) monitoring. To control Bro’s operation, users
express policy in the Bro Scripting Language, a high-level, purpose-built
interpreted language. Bro uses binpac (Section 2.2) to parse protocols, and
ships with binpac grammars for many popular protocols (FTP, HTTP,
SMTP, SMB/CIFS, etc.). Protocol grammars define “protocol events,”
which trigger execution of “handlers” written in the Bro scripting language.
Bro’s main code branch uses a single-threaded, non-blocking design. Efforts
to parallelize Bro have produced the Bro cluster, a multi-machine system
with network-based synchronization [22], and “superlinear” Bro, a
multithreaded implementation [23].
Snort [21] was developed by Martin Roesch, and is currently maintained
by Sourcefire, a commercial entity. The code is available under an
open-source license; signatures are available commercially via Sourcefire,
and through the Snort community.
Commercial vendors including TippingPoint, Cisco, and Radware also
produce intrusion detection and prevention systems, but these are not
widely studied in the research community.
2.4 Hardware Approaches
Intrusion detection’s challenging performance requirements have motivated
several groups to explore hardware-based solutions. Approaches range from
developing accelerators to support existing software solutions, to full
systems implemented on special-purpose hardware.
2.4.1 Hardware: Accelerators
Hardware accelerators increase performance by oﬄoading a
narrowly-targeted piece of the workload onto purpose-built hardware.
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In some cases, a NIDS need only analyze the beginning of a flow to
determine what action (drop, allow, inspect) should be taken for
subsequent traffic. The ICSI Shunt [24] keeps a per-flow hashtable in a fast
hardware cache. If the system determines that a flow is either safe or unsafe
(meaning no further analysis is required), the Shunt avoids routing traffic
to the NIDS, reducing its workload.
Clark et al. [25] explored using Intel IXP network processors and Xilinx
Vertex FPGAs to accelerate string matching operations. The group claimed
1 Gbps attainable throughput, but at a coarse level of semantic analysis.
Brodie [26] demonstrated regular expression matching at 4 Gbps using a
highly optimized FPGA, which consumed the input text two characters at
a time.
2.4.2 Hardware: Systems
The SafeCard [27] project used an Intel IXP network processor to perform
intrusion protection in real time at up to 1 Gbps. Owing to implementation
on the Intel IXP network processor, SafeCard developed novel techniques
for (1) managing a highly vertical (five-level) memory hierarchy, and (2)
partitioning the IDS workload into a form which effectively utilized the
unique execution resources of the IXP architecture: small microengines
coupled with a general-purpose processor.
2.5 Classification
Classification splits network traffic into predefined classes—often based on
application protocol—to control quality of service. A closely related topic
to intrusion detection, classification also requires semantic understanding of
protocols to operate effectively.
Moore and Papagiannaki [28] measured the effectiveness of several forms
of classification. Starting from port-only classification, the group used
progressively more stateful and computationally intensive techniques,
culminating in full per-flow tracking. Port-based classification (the most
basic type) correctly identified the application protocol in approximately
7
70%4 of their flows; inspecting the protocol of the first kilobyte raised
correctness to 80%. Per-flow stateful protocol parsing classified over 99% of
traffic correctly.
BLINC [29], the Blind Classifier, identifies application protocol without
looking at payloads. BLINC takes an omniscient view of the network, and
uses social and functional characteristics of network traffic5 to determine
application protocol. PISA [30], another payload-blind classifier, uses
k -means clustering in an eleven-dimensional space to identify application
protocols.
4Their study has no notion of “recall”: every flow was classified correctly, otherwise, it
was marked as wrong (even if unknown).
5Number of ports for incoming and outgoing traffic, number of IP addresses, and global
topology.
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CHAPTER 3
NETWORK PROTOCOLS AND
SOFTWARE VULNERABILITIES
Network protocols govern the exchange of information over computer
networks. Trends in protocol design have mirrored broader trends in
software engineering; as programming languages have come in and out of
fashion, so have ideas about network protocol design. Economic factors
have also made their mark: while early designs favored efficient on-the-wire
messaging formats, today’s protocols stress cross-platform portability and
human readability.1
Protocol parsing for NIDS is a delicate juggling act. An effective NIDS
must accurately recover protocol semantics in the face of multi-Gbps data
rates, without adding noticeable latency to network flows (if the NIDS is on
the forwarding path). This chapter discusses common idioms used by
protocol designers, and follows with a review of several representative
vulnerabilities.
3.1 Protocol Archetypes
As a preliminary step in designing a high-performance parser, we made a
detailed study of the most popular Internet protocols. The study yielded
many useful insights about the tradeoffs protocol designers face, as well as
what kind of parser would be suitable for the general task of recovering
protocol semantics (events, pieces of data, etc.) from a man-in-the-middle
perspective. In the following section, we describe the four general design
patterns encountered in our study.
1Most of the insights in this section apply equally to file formats, which (like network
protocols) aim to communicate state from one instance of a program to another. Likewise,
designing a network intrusion detection system shares many goals with a file-based virus
scanner.
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Struct-Style Protocols
The first class of protocol, characterized by packed, undelineated binary
data, we call struct-style protocols. These protocols are basically struct
types in C, cast to opaque void* buffers encapsulated in transport-layer
segments for transit.
Struct-style protocols are compact. Like struct types in C, fields are
implicitly labeled by their offset relative to the start of the structure,
avoiding the need for explicit labeling. Binary types remain in their
in-memory representation, rather than a human-readabe format
(ASCII/Unicode). In the simplest case, sending application data over the
network is as simple as copying a structure from memory into a
transport-layer buffer, which the application hands off to the operating
system for transit via a system call. Owing to the minimal work necessary
to interchange application and network data, struct-style protocols are
amenable to very high-performance implementation. Additionally, provided
the endpoint application environments (programming language, compiler,
machine architecture, etc.) are sufficiently similar, this kind of protocol is
the most straightforward to program.
The benefits of struct-style protocols lean heavily on the network’s
(assumed) homogeneity. Unfortunately, the success of many early
struct-style protocols meant they were used to network everything from
microcontrollers to mainframes, a decidedly heterogeneous collection of
computers. Sending raw binary data over a network makes assumptions
about host byte ordering, word alignment, and word size, none of which are
broadly standardized. Additionally, the benefits of memcpy-like data
movement are lost on receivers, which must walk protocol data field-by-field
to ensure data integrity (on pain of opening the system to compromise).
Further, struct-style protocols are minimally extensible, and, owing to their
use of C-style strings, do not handle variable-length fields well. Add the
fact that binary formats are not human readable (requiring the use of
analysis tools to inspect protocol messages), and it becomes clear why
struct-style protocols are undesirable for all but legacy, and very
high-performance applications.
Owing to their original implementation in the C programming language,
many of the Internet’s core protocols (e.g. IP, TCP, DNS) are struct-style.
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Unfortunately, the difficulties of implementing binary protocol parsers by
hand has led to many code defects; DNS, in particular, has been plagued
with a long history of exploitable code defects (e.g. [31], [32], [33]). Further
complicating matters, the difficulties of parsing DNS apply to intrusion
detection systems, making polymorphic exploits against DNS very hard to
detect. The challenges of parsing struct-style protocols are addressed more
fully in Chapter 4.
IETF-Style Protocols
The Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP), Hypertext Transfer Protocol
(HTTP), and File Transfer Protocol (FTP) fall into the second group of
protocols, which we call IETF-style after the committee that designed
them.2 These protocols feature production rules identified by
English-language ASCII keywords, which make them human-readable.
IETF-style protocols deliberately mimic context-free languages; like CFLs,
IETF-style protocols feature variable-length production rules, and
grammars defined using Augmented Backus-Naur Form (see, for example,
RFC 2616 [34]). Parsing context-free languages is a well-studied topic in
computer science; by designing protocols this way, the IETF accelerated
application development by allowing reuse of insights from compiler design
in network application programming.
By virtue of their CFL-like production rules, IETF-style protocols offer
great extensibility without the complexity of struct-style protocols.
Variable-length parameters and multipart messages are both well-supported
in the IETF paradigm. Also, IETF-style protocols rely on simple ASCII
sequences to identify production rules and delineate fields, which increases
portability and human-readability. The chief disadvantage of these
protocols is the heavyweight translation layer required to send and receive
data to/from the network.
It is worth noting that all classes of attacks against websites—SQL
injection, cross-site scripting, cross-site request forgery, etc.—use HTTP, an
IETF-style protocol. The ability to extract and apply constraints to HTTP
GET/POST parameters at line rate is a key enabler in the battle against
2The Internet Engineering Task Force
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web-based attacks.
Structured Binary Protocols
The third class of protocol, structured binary, combines some characteristics
of struct-style with IETF-style design. The archetype of this style is
Abstract Syntax Notation 1 (ASN.1 [35]). ASN.1 finds use in the Secure
Sockets Layer (SSL) protocol [36], the Simple Network Management
Protocol [37], X.509 [38], LDAP [39], and some proprietary interbank
financial networks.3
Strictly speaking, ASN.1 is a machine-independent grammar used to
specify the structure of binary messages; ASN.1 encoding rules4 specify how
to serialize and deserialize network data. Like IETF-style protocols, ASN.1
messages have nodes, which can be arranged flexibly; the serialization rules
permit variable-length data fields and arbitrary nesting of child nodes.
ASN.1 message nodes are arranged in Type-Length-Value (TLV) form:
each node has its numerically assigned type and length prepended. With
each node’s length prepended, a fully optimized parser can offer fast
sequential lookup by skipping uninteresting nodes.
Structured Text Protocols
The final class of protocol is structured text. Similar to structured binary
protocols, structured text protocols use a tree-like structure, but lack
length-prefixing. The most heavily used structured text protocol today is
the Extensible Markup Language (XML), and the related suite of
XHTML/DHTML technologies used to author webpages.
XML is the newest of the data formats discussed in this section, and
represents the extreme of making data formats user-friendly at the expense
of efficiency. XML documents are tree-like with very loosely constrained
structure; the format permits variable-length child nodes, to arbitrary
3Sun XDR is another, albeit less popular, example of a structured binary protocol.
4ASN.1 provides several of these “encoding rules,” among them BER, the “Binary
Encoding Rules,” and DER, the “Distinguished Encoding Rules.” One of the major
complaints users have about ASN.1 is that it fails to take a single position on how messages
should be represented on the wire.
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depth. XML also offers robust support for international character sets with
Unicode, forcing parsers to handle variable-length character encodings (e.g.
UTF-8 [40]). On the other hand, XML documents are very verbose, which
limits how much semantic content a parser must extract at a given data
rate.
To date, XML per se has not been a fertile ground for software
vulnerabilities. While some vulnerabilities have manifested in XML parsers,
the data format itself (like any other protocol) is merely a vehicle by which
data flows between endpoints. However, application writers are continually
demanding greater flexibility, human readability, and support for
internationalization in their protocols and data formats. As these
challenges become more important in Internet engineering efforts, we
believe the design of future data formats will trend toward XML, especially
given its support for internationalization.
The Failure of Regular Expressions
In this work, we define a vulnerability as a defect in a piece of
network-facing software which offers some potential for misuse. An exploit,
then, is a particular way of misusing a vulnerability. Parsing for intrusion
detection involves a fundamental tradeoff between accuracy and
performance.
To this author’s knowledge, there is no intrusion detection system which
can perform full parsing at 1 Gbps or greater on commodity hardware. On
the other hand, some intrusion detection systems have sidestepped full
parsing by, for example, searching for static strings known to correspond to
a particular exploit in a network flow. Fast (sometimes
hardware-accelerated) static string searches and regular-expression
matchers have been built, and while these systems can identify particular
instances of an exploit (e.g. the Code Red Worm’s [41] exploit against the
CVE-2001-0500 vulnerability [42]), their inability to recover protocol
semantics generally, hinders their ability to look past different exploits
which misuse the same vulnerability. In the case of an HTTP-based exploit,
even trivial rearrangement of GET/POST parameters can confound a static
string matcher.
13
Building an effective NIDS requires a parser. While some techniques
(Protomatching [15], VESPA [20]) can optimize the workload, trying to
shortcut around parsing allows an attacker to evade detection with even a
small amount of polymorphism in their attacks.
3.2 Vulnerabilities
This section presents the details of several remotely exploitable software
vulnerabilities. The vulnerabilities are chosen to illustrate the breadth of
detection complexity, from the trivial to the very difficult.
3.2.1 CVE-2002-1368: CUPS Negative Content-Length
Vulnerability
CVE-2002-1368 [43] was triggered by incorrect handling of a signed integer
in HTTP headers. The code defect led to a remotely exploitable
denial-of-service vulnerability in the Common Unix Printing System
(CUPS) implementation of the Internet Printing Protocol (IPP) [44].
As noted in the previous section, Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) is
an IETF-Style protocol. A HTTP session begins with a request from the
client, followed by a response by the server. The client initiates the
exchange by writing a request similar to what follows over a transport-layer
socket (ellipses represent text omitted for brevity):
GET / HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:80
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; Intel Mac OS X (...) )
Accept: application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html (...)
Accept-Language: en-us
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Connection: keep-alive
As the reader can see, HTTP requests consist of a command (GET),
followed by a path (/) and protocol version (HTTP/1.1).5 In the example
5No translation tools were used to “decode” the above message; the message format is
flat text (as shown), with ASCII-encoded text and TCP for reliable transport.
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given above, the client has appended request metadata in the form of
textual key-value pairs.
When a client submits a job to CUPS for printing via IPP, the client
sends the job to the CUPS daemon using an HTTP POST request. The
HTTP POST header includes a Content-Length key-value pair, which
specifies the number of octets in the POST request, e.g., Content-Length:
312. A message cannot have negative length; the shortest possible message
(the empty message) would have length zero. Unfortunately, some versions
of CUPS parsed negative Content-Length “correctly” (they did not signal
an error), and subsequently wrote a negative value into a signed integer
within the server process.
After parsing the length, CUPS passes the signed quantity to malloc().
Since malloc() takes an unsigned argument, passing a signed int to
malloc() results in an improper implicit cast. Due to two’s complement
encoding, the malloc() call would interpret the “negative” content lengths
as a very large unsigned quantity, causing an error.6 On failure to allocate
the huge amount of memory associated with the “negative” value, the
malloc() call fails, returning a null pointer to the application. When
dereferenced, the null pointer causes a segmentation fault, crashing the
process.
Exploits against CVE-2002-1368 conform to a regular language. The
NIDS protocol parser must be able to recognize complex exploit attempts,
but also simple exploits (such as this one) with high performance.
3.2.2 CVE-2002-0063: CUPS Attribute Length Bug
CVE-2002-0063 exposed a remotely exploitable buffer overflow in the CUPS
implementation of IPP [44]. When an IPP client issues a print job to CUPS
via HTTP POST (see the previous section for details), the protocol permits
the client to embed a variable number of “attributes” which specify details
of the job (e.g. paper orientation). The client prepends the length of each
attribute as an unsigned, big-endian 16-bit quantity.
6Two’s complement is a convenient way of representing negative numbers, which allows
digital arithmetic units to ignore the sign of their operands and still operate correctly.
To convert a positive integer into its negative two’s complement representation, simply
complement all its bits, and add 1 to the result. A 32-bit -1 is encoded as 0xffffffff.
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While 16-bit lengths permit a 64 KB (65,536-byte) attribute, CUPS
declares a buffer of only 8 KB to hold the attribute values. A crafted
request can write past the end of the buffer, allowing arbitrary code
execution using standard buffer overflow techniques.
If the HTTP message carrying the IPP request were constrained to arrive
contiguously, a regular expression could detect an exploit attempt by
scanning for an attribute length over 8192 bytes. However, HTTP provides
functionality to “chunk” POST data, which permits splitting a POST
request across several discontinuous blocks. To detect exploits against
CVE-2002-0063 in the presence of chunking, the protocol parser must scan
across chunk boundaries, which is beyond the capabilities of an unmodified
regular expression engine. Understanding (and potentially parsing) HTTP
syntax is necessary to detect exploits against CVE-2002-0063 effectively.
3.2.3 DNS Pointer Cycles
The DNS protocol [45], a struct-style protocol, is used to resolve domain
names to IP addresses on the Internet.
The overall structure of DNS is a multiply rooted tree, where each
organization controls its own zone of authority. As one traverses downward
through the tree, a domain name is constructed right-to-left, using textual
identifiers called labels. Domain names have no explicit, textual
representation in DNS proper; however, the convention of using periods to
delineate labels has led to the familiar notation of a hostname:
tindalos.crhc.uiuc.edu. Note that, owing to DNS’s tree-like structure,
hosts near each other in the tree share a common suffix.
To conserve bandwidth, DNS includes a mechanism to avoid duplicating
a common suffix within a single message. When writing a DNS response,
the application writes the full hostname the first time it appears—but after
the name appears in full, subsequent names with a common suffix can refer
back to it using a binary sentinel followed by a numeric offset.
DNS permits names with dozens of labels. Unfortunately, allowing such
long names allows an attacker to exploit a DNS parser by crafting packets
with very deep recursive cycles. At best, such packets can slow DNS parsers
to a crawl, or worse, run the parser out of stack space, causing it to crash.
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To detect a pointer cycle, the NIDS protocol parser must fully walk each
DNS packet that enters the network, and check it for cycles. Performing
such thorough analysis is a daunting task. The prevalence of DNS,
combined with the high performance cost of analyzing it, makes DNS
performance a crucial test of NIDS performance.
3.2.4 CVE-2005-4560: WMF SetAbortProc() Bug
Windows Metafile (WMF) [46] is a vector graphics format developed in the
early 1990s by Microsoft. The format permits specification of a series of
Windows GDI7 calls, which when replayed, draws the contents of the file
onto a GDI rendering surface. The format offered the standard benefits of
vector graphics formats, including small file size and the ability to resize
without pixelation.
When WMF was designed, cooperative (non-preemptive) multitasking
was prevalent. Also, graphics files were not as frequently interchanged as
today, making security less of a concern. In any case, the format allows
specification of a binary “abort procedure,” called if the rendering engine is
interrupted. Attackers began to misuse this feature in late 2005, using the
abort handler for drive-by downloads where an attacker could run arbitrary
code on a victims computer simply by convincing them to render a WMF,
requiring only a web site visit for clients using Internet Explorer [47].
Like DNS pointer cycles, this vulnerability is hard to detect because it
requires scanning a variable field-length binary structure for a particular
pattern of bytes. The WMF SetAbortProc() bug is even more difficult to
detect, due to (1) the huge number of protocol exchanges which could
potentially embed a WMF (e.g. HTTP, instant message chats, email, etc.),
and (2) the length of WMF files, which can reach into the tens, or even
hundreds, of kilobytes in length.
7The Graphical Device Interface, the API Windows exposed to userspace programs for
doing drawing.
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3.3 Forward
As this section has shown, protocol design embodies many tradeoffs. Older
protocols tend to be more compact, whereas newer ones, while more
“wasteful,” favor ease of human comprehension, and extensibility.
Detecting vulnerabilities is intimately related to protocol parsing. While
it seems attractive to use simple primitives, such as static string searches
and regular expressions, to detect vulnerabilities, these mechanisms are
trivially evaded by even the simplest of polymorphic exploits.
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CHAPTER 4
VESPA: THE VULNERABILITY
SIGNATURE PARSER
In this section, we introduce VESPA, an architecture for high-speed
protocol parsing.
4.1 Introduction
Detecting and preventing attacks is a critical aspect of network security.
The dominant paradigm in network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) has
been the exploit signature, which recognizes a particular pattern of misuse
(an exploit). An alternative approach is to use a vulnerability signature,
which describes the class of messages that trigger a vulnerability on the
end system, based on the behavior of the application. Vulnerability
signatures are exploit-generic, as they focus on how the end host interprets
the message, rather than how the particular exploit works, and thus can
recognize polymorphic and copycat exploits.
Exploit signatures are represented using byte-string patterns or regular
expressions. Vulnerability signatures, on the other hand, usually employ
protocol parsing to recover the semantic content of the communication and
then decide whether it triggers a vulnerability. The semantic modeling
allows vulnerability signatures to be both more general and more precise
than exploit signatures. However, this comes at a high performance cost.
To date, vulnerability signatures have only been considered for use on end
hosts, severely limiting their deployment.
In our work, we observe that full and generic protocol parsing is not
necessary for detecting vulnerability signatures. Using custom-built,
hand-coded vulnerability signature recognizers, we show that these
signatures can be detected 3 to 37 times faster than the speed of full
protocol parsing. Therefore, there is no inherent performance penalty for
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using vulnerability signatures instead of exploit signatures.
Motivated by this, we design an architecture, called VESPA,1 for
matching vulnerability signatures at speeds adequate for a
high-performance enterprise NIDS, around 1 Gbps. We build our
architecture on a foundation of fast string and pattern matchers, connected
with control logic. This allows us to do deep packet inspection and model
complex behavior, while maintaining high performance. We also minimize
the amount of implicit state maintained by the parser. By avoiding full,
in-memory semantic representation of the message, we eliminate much of
the cost of generic protocol parsing. Finally, in many cases we are able to
eliminate the recursive nature of protocol analysis, allowing us to skip
analysis of large subsections of the message.
We have implemented a prototype of VESPA; tests show that it matches
vulnerability signatures about three times faster than equivalent
full-protocol parsing, as implemented in binpac [13]. Our architecture
matches most protocols in software at speeds greater than 1 Gbps. Further,
we show that our text protocol parsing is dominated by string matching,
suggesting that special-purpose hardware for pattern matching would
permit parsing text protocols at much higher speeds. Our binary protocol
parsing is also well-adapted to hardware-aided implementation, as our
careful state management fits well with the constrained memory
architectures of network processors.
4.2 Design
This section presents the design of the parser.
4.2.1 Background
Vulnerability signatures were originally proposed by Wang et al. [48] as an
alternative to traditional, exploit-based signatures. While exploit signatures
describe the properties of the exploit, vulnerability signatures describe how
the vulnerability gets triggered in an application. Consider the following
exploit signature for Code Red [49]:
1Vulnerability Signature Parsing Architecture
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urlcontent:"ida?NNNNNNNNNNNN..."
The signature describes how the exploit operates: it uses the ISAPI
interface (invoked for files with extension “.ida”) and inserts a long string
of N’s, leading to a buffer overflow. While effective against Code Red, this
signature would not match Code Red II [41]; that variant used X’s in place
of the N’s. A vulnerability signature, on the other hand, does not specify
how the worm works, but rather how the application-level vulnerability is
triggered. An extract from the CodeRed signature in Shield [48] is:
c = MATCH_STR_LEN(>>P_Get_Request.URI,"id[aq]\?(.*)$",limit);
IF (c > limit)
# Exploit!
This signature captures any request that overflows the ISAPI buffer,
making it effective against Code Red, Code Red II, and any other worm or
attack that exploits the ISAPI buffer overflow. In fact, this signature could
well have been written before the release of either of the Code Red worms,
as the vulnerability in the ISAPI was published a month earlier [50]. Thus,
while exploit signatures are reactive, vulnerability signatures can
proactively protect systems with known vulnerabilities until they are
patched (which can take weeks or months [51]).
4.2.2 High-Level Objectives
To make vulnerability signatures practical for use in network intrusion
detection systems, we developed VESPA, an efficient vulnerability
specification and matching architecture. The processes of writing a protocol
specification and writing a vulnerability signature are coupled to allow the
parser generator to perform optimizations on the generated code that
specialize it for the vulnerabilities the author wishes to match.
Our system is based on the following design principles:
• Use of fast matching primitives
• Explicit state management
• Avoiding parsing of irrelevant message parts
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Since text and binary protocols require different parsing approaches, we
describe our design of each type of parser and how we apply the design
principles listed above. We first give a brief outline of how the system
works, and then go into detail in the subsequent sections on how our
approach works.
We use fast matching primitives—string matching, pattern matching
(regular expressions), and binary traversal—that may be easily oﬄoaded to
hardware. The signature author specifies a number of matcher primitive
entries, which correspond to fields needed by the signature to evaluate the
vulnerability constraint. Each matcher contains embedded code which
allows the matching engine to automatically extract a value from the result
of the match. For example, the HTTP specification includes a string
matcher for “Content-Length:”, which has an extraction function that
converts the string representation of the following number to a integer.
Along with each matcher, the author also specifies a handler function
that will be executed following the extraction. The handlers allow the
signature author to model the protocol state machine and enable additional
matchers. For example, if a matcher discovers that an HTTP request
message contains the POST command, it will in turn enable a matcher to
parse and extract the message body. We also allow the author to define
handlers that are called when an entire message has been matched.
The author checks vulnerability constraints inside the handler functions.
Therefore constraint evaluation can be at the field level, intra-message level,
and inter-message level. Depending on the complexity of the vulnerability
signature, the author can choose where to evaluate the constraint most
efficiently.
Text Protocols
We found that full recursive parsing of text protocols is both too slow and
unnecessary for detecting vulnerabilities. However, simple string or regular
expression matching is often insufficient to express a vulnerability
constraint precisely in cases where the vulnerability depends on some
protocol context. In our system, we combine the benefits of the two
approaches by connecting multiple string and pattern matching primitives
with control logic specialized to the protocol.
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Matching Primitives. To make our design amenable to hardware
acceleration we built it around simple matching primitives. At the core, we
use a fast multi-string matching algorithm. This allows us to approximate
the performance of simple pattern-based IDSes for simple vulnerability
signatures. Since our system does not depend on any specific string
matching algorithm, we have identified several well-studied
algorithms [7, 52] and hardware optimizations [53] that could be employed
by our system. Furthermore, hardware-accelerated regular expression
matching is also becoming a reality [26]. As discussed later, this would
further enhance the signature author’s ability to locate protocol fields.
Minimal Parsing and State Managment. We have found that
protocol fields can be divided into two categories: core fields, which define
the structure and semantics of the protocol, and application fields, which
have meaning to the application, but are not necessary to understand the
rest of the message. An example of a core field is the Content-Length in
HTTP, as it determines the size of the message body that follows in the
protocol, whereas a field such as Accept-Charset is only relevant to the
application.
Our approach in writing vulnerability signatures is to parse and store
only the core fields, and the application fields relevant to the vulnerability,
while skipping the rest. This allows us to avoid storing irrelevant fields,
focusing our resources on those fields that are absolutely necessary.
Although many text protocols are defined in RFCs using a recursive BNF
grammar, we find that protocols often use techniques that make
identification of core fields possible without resorting to a recursive parse.
For example, HTTP headers are specified on a separate line; as a result, a
particular header can be located within a message by a simple string
search. Header fields that are not relevant to a vulnerability will be skipped
by the multi-string matcher, without involving the rest of the parser. Other
text protocols follow a similar structure; for example, SMTP uses labeled
commands such as “MAIL FROM” and “RCPT TO,” which can readily be
identified in the message stream.
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4.2.3 Binary Protocols
While some of the techniques we use for text protocol parsing apply to
binary protocols as well, binary protocols pose special challenges that must
be handled differently from text.
Matching Primitives. Unlike text protocols, binary protocols often
lack explicit field labeling. Instead, a parser infers the meaning of a field
from its position in the message—relative to either the message start, or to
other fields. In simple cases, the parser can use fixed offsets to find fields.
In more complicated cases, the position of a field varies based on inter-field
dependencies (e.g., variable-length data, where the starting offset of a field
in a message varies based on the length of earlier fields), making parsing
data-dependent. Thus, parsers must often traverse many or all of the
preceding fields. This is still simpler than a full parse, since the parser only
examines the lengths and values of structure-dependent fields.
Since binary protocols are more heavily structured than text protocols,
we need a matching primitive that is sufficiently aware of this structure
while still maintaining high performance. We call this type of parser a
binary traverser.
Designing an efficient binary protocol traverser is difficult because binary
protocol designs do not adhere to any common standard. In our study of
many common binary protocols, we found that they most often utilize the
following constructs: C structures, arrays, length-prefixed buffers,
sentinel-terminated buffers, and field-driven case evaluation (switch). The
binpac protocol parser generator uses variations on these constructs as
building blocks for creating a protocol parser. We found binpac to have
sufficient expressive power to generate parsers for complex binary protocols.
However, binpac parsers perform a full protocol parse rather than a simple
binary traversal, so we use a modification to improve their performance.
Minimal Parsing and State Management. We reduced overhead of
original binpac parsers for state management and skipped parsing
unimportant fields. Because binpac carefully separates the duties of the
protocol parser and the traffic analysis system which uses it, we were able
to port binpac specifications written for the Bro IDS to our system. We
retain the protocol semantics and structure written in the Bro versions but
use our own system for managing state and expressing constraints. While
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we feel that additional improvements may be made in generating fast
binary traversers, we were able to obtain substantial improvements in the
performance of binpac by optimizing it to the task of traversal rather than
full parsing. Furthermore, the binpac language provides exceptional
expressiveness for a wide range of protocols, allowing our system to be more
easily deployed on new protocols.
Discussion
By flattening the protocol structure, we can ignore any part of a message
which does not directly influence properly processing the message or
matching a specific vulnerability. However, some protocols are heavily
recursive and may not be flattened completely without significantly
reducing match precision. We argue that it is rarely necessary to
understand and parse each and every field and structural construct of a
protocol message to match a vulnerability. Consider an XML vulnerability
in the skin processing of Trillian (CVE-2002-2366 [54]). An attacker may
gain control of the program by passing an over-length string in a file
attribute, leading to a traditional buffer overflow. Only the file attribute,
in the prefs/control/colors entity can trigger the vulnerability, while
instances of file in other entities are not vulnerable. To match this
vulnerability with our system, the signature author can use a minimal
recursive parser which only tracks entity open and close tags. The matcher
can use a stack of currently open tags to tell whether it is in the
prefs/control/colors entity and match file attributes which will cause
the buffer overflow. The generated parser is recursive but only for the
specific fields that are needed to match the vulnerability. This type of
signature is a middle-ground for our system—it will provide higher
performance than a full parser while requiring the user to manipulate more
state than a simpler vulnerability.
In rare cases it may be necessary to do full protocol parsing to properly
match a vulnerability signature. While our system is designed to enhance
the performance of simpler vulnerability signatures, it is still able to
generate high-performance full recursive parsers. The drawback to our
approach versus binpac or GAPA in this situation is that the user must
manage the parser state manually, which may be error prone.
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1 parser HTTP Request {
2 d i spatch ( ) %{ deploy ( ver s ) ; deploy ( i s p o s t ) ;
deploy ( c r l f ) ; }%
3
4 in t ver s = str matcher "HTTP /1."
5 handler hand l e ver s ( )
6 %{ end = next whi tespace ( r e s t ) ;
7 ver s = s t r t o i n t ( r e s t , end ) ; }%
8
9 hand l e ver s ( ) %{ // handle d i f f e r e n t l y depending on vers ion . . . }%
10
11 bool i s p o s t = str matcher "POST"
12 handler hand l e pos t ( )
13 %{ i s p o s t=true ; }%
14
15 hand l e pos t ( ) %{ i f ( i s p o s t ) { deploy ( con t en t l eng th ) ; } }%
16
17 i n t con t en t l eng th = str matcher "Content -Length :"
18 handler hand l e c l ( )
19 %{ end = nex t l i n e ( r e s t ) ;
20 con t en t l eng th = s t r t o i n t ( r e s t , end ) ; }%
21
22 hand l e c l ( ) %{ i f ( th i s−>con t en t l eng th < 0) { // EXPLOIT! }
23 e l s e { deploy ( body ) ; } }%
24
25 bool c r l f = str matcher "\r\n\r\n" | | "\n\n"
26 %{ // do nothing e x p l i c i t here }%
27
28 Buf f e r body = extended matcher c r l f
29 handler handle body ( )
30 %{ body = Buf f e r ( r e s t , th i s−>con t en t l eng th ) ;
31 stopMachine ( ) ; }%
32
33 handle body ( ) %{ // process body using another l ay e r }%
34 }
Figure 4.1: Sample Specification for HTTP Requests (Simplified)
We do not yet address the problem of protocol detection. However, our
system can be integrated with prior work [55] in an earlier stage of the
intrusion detection system. Furthermore, the high-speed matching
primitives used by VESPA may also be used to match protocol detection
signatures.
4.2.4 Language
We have developed a vulnerability signature expression language for use
with our system. We give an example vulnerability specification for the
CUPS negative content length vulnerability in Figure 4.2.4.
Writing a signature involves specifying the matchers for the core fields of
the protocol message and then specifying additional matchers to locate the
vulnerability. We specify a single protocol message using a parser type.
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The code generator maps this message parser to a C++ class that will
contain each state field as a member variable. Inside a message parser, the
vulnerability signature author defines handler function declarations and
field variable declarations with matching primitives. The author can specify
additional member variables that are not directly associated with a matcher
using member vars %{ ... }%.
Each underlying matching primitive always searches for all the requested
strings and fields with which the matcher is initialized. For example, an
HTTP matcher might search for “Content-Type:” in a message even
though this string should only be expected in certain cases. This allows the
primitive matcher to run in parallel with the state machine and constraint
evaluation, though we have not yet implemented this. It also prevents the
matching primitives from needing to back up to parse a newly desired field.
We provide a utility for keeping track of which fields the matcher should
expect and perform extraction and which to ignore. This state is controlled
using the deploy(var ) function. This function may be called from any
handler function, and initially by the dispatch function. deploy marks a
variable as expected in a state mask stored inside the parser. This will
cause the matcher to execute the variable extraction function and handler
when it is matched. A handler function may in turn enable additional
matchers (including re-enabling itself) using the deploy function. The
parser ignores any primitive match that is not set to be active using deploy.
The parser automatically calls the dispatch function each time the
parser starts parsing a new protocol message. This allows the author to
define which fields should be matched from the start of parsing. It also
allows the initialization of member variables created using member vars.
Conversely, the parser automatically calls destroy to allow any resources
allocated in dispatch to be freed.
Matcher Primitives
Protocol fields and matcher primitives are the heart of a vulnerability
specification. The format of matcher primitive specification is:
var_type symbol = matching_primitive meta-data
handler handler_func_name()
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%{
// embedded C++ code to extract the value
}%
The var type specifies the storage type of the field; e.g., uint32. The
symbol is the name of the field that will be stored as a member of the C++
parser class. There are three types of matching primitives.
1. str matcher (string matcher primitive): The meta-data passed to
this matcher are a string or sequence of strings separated by ||, and
this instructs the underlying multi-string matching engine to match
this string and then execute its extraction function. It supports
matching multiple different strings that are semantically identical
using or (“||”).
2. bin matcher (binary traversal primitive): The meta-data passed to
this matcher are the file name of a binpac specification. This is
followed by a colon and the name of a binpac record type. The
meta-data end with the name of a field inside that record that the
author wishes to extract (e.g. IPP.binpac: IPP Message.version num).
The generated binpac parser will then call back to our system to
perform the extraction and run the handler for the requested field.
3. extended matcher (extension to another matcher): This construct
allows us to perform additional extractions after matching a single
string or binary field. This is often useful when multiple fields are
embedded after a single match. It also allows the author to specify a
different extraction function depending on which state is expected.
The meta-data passed to this primitive are the name of another
variable that uses a standard matching primitive.
Each variable match also specifies an extraction function within braces,
%{ and }%, which extracts a relevant field from the message. We have
provided a number of helper functions that the author can use in the
extraction function, such as string conversion and white space elimination.
In a string matcher extraction function, there are two predefined variables
the signature author can use and modify: rest and end. The rest variable
points to the first byte of input after the string that was matched. The
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parser also defines end, which allows the extraction function to store where
the extraction ends. Extended matchers run immediately following the
extraction function of the string matcher on which they depend and in the
same context. Hence, any changes to the state of rest and end should be
carefully accounted for in extended matcher extraction functions.
There are two additional functions that the author can use inside the
extraction function of a string matcher: stopMachine() and
restartMachine(ptr ). These functions suspend and restart pattern
matching on the input file. This is useful, for example, to prevent the
system from matching spurious strings inside the body of an HTTP
message. The restartMachine(ptr ) function restarts the pattern
matching at a new offset specified by ptr . This allows the matcher to skip
portions of the message.
Handlers
Each matcher may also have an associated handler function. The handler
function is executed after the extraction and only if the matcher is set to be
active with deploy. The signature author defines the body of the handler
function using C++ code. In addition to calling the deploy function,
handler bodies are where vulnerability constraints can be expressed. We do
not yet address the reporting mechanism when a vulnerability is matched.
However, since any C++ code may be in the handler, the author may use a
variety of methods, such as exceptions or integer codes. The author may
also use the handler functions to pass portions of a protocol message to
another parser to implement layering and encapsulation.
While structurally different from existing protocol parser generators like
GAPA and binpac, our language is sufficiently expressive to model many
text and binary protocols and vulnerabilities. Porting a protocol
specification from an RFC or an existing spec in another language (like
binpac or GAPA) is fairly straightforward once the author understands the
protocol semantics.
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4.2.5 Implementation
Compiler
We designed a compiler to generate machine-executable vulnerability
signature matchers from our language. We implemented the compiler using
the Perl programming language. Our implementation leverages the “Higher
Order Perl” [56] Lexer and Parser classes, which kept down the
implementation complexity: the entire compiler is 600 lines. Approximately
70% of the compiler code specifies the lexical and grammatical structures of
our language; the balance performs symbol rewriting, I/O stream
management, and boilerplate C++ syntax insertion.
Our compiler operates on a single parser file (e.g., myparser.p), which
defines a signature matcher. The generated code is a C++ class which
extends one of the parser superclasses. The class definition consists of two
files (following the example above, myparser.h and myparser.cc), which
jointly specify the generated parser subclass.
Parser Classes
Generated C++ classes for both binary and text parsers are structurally
very similar, but differ in how they interface with the matching primitives.
We have optimized the layout and performance of this code. We use inlined
functions and code whenever possible. Many extraction helper functions are
actually macros to reduce unnecessary function call overhead. We store the
expected state set with deploy using a bit vector.
For string matchers, we use the sfutil library from Snort [21], which
efficiently implements the Aho–Corasick (AC) algorithm [7]. Because the
construction of a keyword trie for the AC algorithm can be
time-consuming, we generate a separate reusable class which contains the
pre-built AC trie. Our text matcher is not strongly tied to this particular
multi-string matching implementation, and we have also prototyped it with
the libSpare AC implementation [57].
We use binpac to generate a binary traverser for our parsers. As input,
the compiler expects a binpac specification for the binary protocol. This
should include all the record types in the protocol as well as the basic
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analyzer, connection, and flow binpac types. We then use the refine
feature of binpac to embed the extraction functions and callbacks to our
parser. Since binpac does simple extractions automatically, it is often
unnecessary to write additional code that processes the field before it is
assigned. Like the AC algorithm for text parsers, the binary parser is not
heavily tied to the binary traversal algorithm or implementation. For a few
protocols, we have developed hand-coded replacements for binpac binary
traversal.
Binary Traversal-Optimized Binpac
We have made several modifications to the binpac parser generator to
improve its performance for binary traversal. The primary enhancement we
made is to change the default model for the in-memory structures binpac
keeps while parsing. The original binpac allocated a C++ class for each
non-primitive type it encountered while parsing. This resulted in an
excessive number of calls to new, even for small messages. To alleviate this
problem, we changed the default behavior of binpac to force all
non-primitive types to be pre-allocated in one object. We use the datauint
type in binpac to store all the possible subtypes that binpac might
encounter. To preserve binpac semantics, we added a new function,
init(params... ), to each non-primitive type in binpac. The init
function contains the same code as the constructor, and we call it wherever
a new object would have been created. It also accepts any arguments that
the constructor takes to allow fields to be propagated from one object to
another. We restrict binpac specifications to be able to pass only primitive
types from object to object. While this reduces our compatibility with
existing binpac specifications, it is easy to change them to support this
limitation.
Some objects in binpac must be specified using a pointer to a dynamically
created object and cannot be pre-allocated. For example, in the Bro DNS
binpac specification, a DNS name is composed of DNS labels. A DNS label
type also contains a DNS name object if the label is a pointer to another
name. This circular dependency is not possible with statically sized classes.
We added the &pointer attribute modifier to the binpac language to allow
the author to specifically mark objects that must be dynamically allocated.
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The final modification we made to binpac was to change the way that it
handled arrays of objects. The original version of binpac created a vector
for each array and stored each element separately. Because binary traversal
only needs to access the data as it is being parsed, we do not need to store
the entire array, only the current element. We eliminated the vector types
entirely and changed binpac to only store the current element in the array
using a pre-allocated object. If the author needs to store data from each
element in the array, he must explicitly store it outside of binpac in the
VESPA parser class using a handler function.
4.2.6 Evaulation
We evaluated VESPA with vulnerabilities in both text and binary
protocols. We implemented matchers for vulnerabilities in the HTTP, DNS,
and IPP protocols. We searched for exploitable bugs in network-facing
code, focusing especially on scenarios where traditional exploit signatures
would fail. As Cui et al. did with GAPA [58], we found the process of
writing a vulnerability signature for a protocol very similar to writing one
for a file format. Thus, we used our system to develop a binary parser for
the Windows Meta-file (WMF) format.
We ran all our experiments on an Ubuntu 7.10 Linux (2.6.22-14-x86 64)
system with a dual-core 2.6 GHz AMD Athlon 64 processor and 4 GB of
RAM (our implementation is single-threaded so we only utilized one core).
We ran the tests on HTTP and DNS on traces of real traffic collected from
the UIUC Coordinated Science Laboratory network. We collected WMF
files from freely available clipart web sites. Since we did not have access to
large volumes of IPP traffic, we tested using a small set of representative
messages. We repeated the trace tests 10 times, and we repeated processing
the IPP messages 1 million times to normalize any system timing
perturbations. We show the standard deviation of these runs using error
bars in the charts.
Micro-benchmarks of Matching Primitives
To evaluate the performance of using fast string matching primitives, we
implemented our parser using two different implementations of the
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Parser Type Bytes
allocated
Num calls
to new
DNS (binpac) 15,812 539
DNS (traversal) 2,296 14
IPP (binpac) 1,360 33
IPP (traversal) 432 6
WMF (binpac) 3,824 94
WMF (traversal) 312 6
(b) Dynamic memory usage for a single mes-
sage for standard binpac vs. binary
traversal
Figure 4.2: Micro-benchmarks
Aho–Corasick (AC) algorithm and compared their performance (Figure
4.2.6a). We used the sfutil library, which is part of the Snort IDS [21], and
the Spare Parts implementation of AC [57]. We used those base
implementations to search for the same strings as our vulnerability matcher
does, but without any of the control logic or constraint checking. We found
that for either AC implementation, the performance of a basic HTTP
vulnerability matcher (which handles optional bodies and chunking) was
very close to that of the string matching primitive.
The performance of string matching alone approximates (generously) the
performance of a simple pattern-based IDS. If the vulnerability signature is
simple enough to be expressed using a simple string match (e.g., the IPP
vulnerability for a negative Content-Length), our system is able to match
it with comparable performance to a pattern based IDS.
We next investigated the performance of binary traversal in binpac. One
of the primary changes we made to binpac was to change its default
memory and allocation behavior. We instrumented the original version of
binpac and a parser built with our binary traversal-optimized version to
assess the effectiveness of this change (Figure 4.2.6b). We saw an overall
reduction in memory usage despite pre-allocating types that may not be
present in the message. We were also able to cut the number of calls to new
by a substantial factor for all three binary protocols we implemented. Our
IPP and WMF traversers do not contain any explicit pointer types
(specified with &pointer), so the number of allocated blocks is constant for
any protocol message. The number of times the DNS parser calls the new
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allocator is proportional to the number of name pointers in the message.
Signature Matching Performance
We evaluated the throughput of our vulnerability signature matching
algorithms compared to the binpac parser generator. Binpac is the most
efficient freely available automated protocol parser generator. We do not
evaluate against GAPA because it has not been publicly released.
Furthermore, binpac far exceeds GAPA in performance because it directly
generates machine code rather than being interpreted [13]. Since binpac is
not specifically designed for vulnerability signatures, we added vulnerability
constraint checking to the binpac protocol specifications. In each of the
following sections we describe the protocol and vulnerabilities we tested
against. We show the results in Figure 4.2.6.
HTTP/IPP. The Common Unix Printing System (CUPS), with its
protocol encapsulation and chunk-capable HTTP parser, illustrates several
design choices which confound exploit-signature writers. The vulnerability
given in CVE-2002-0063 [54] occurs because of the way the Internet
Printing Protocol (IPP) specifies a series of textual key–value pairs, called
attributes. The protocol allows attribute lengths to vary, requiring the
sender to use a 16-bit unsigned integer to specify the length of each
attribute. CUPS reads the specified number of bytes into a buffer on the
stack, but the buffer is only 8192 bytes long, allowing an attacker to
overflow the buffer and execute arbitrary code with the permissions of the
CUPS process. A signature for this attack must check that each attribute
length is less than 8192. IPP is a binary protocol, but it is encapsulated
inside of chunked HTTP for transport. Attackers can obfuscate the exploit
by splitting it across an arbitrary number of HTTP chunks, making it very
hard to detect this attack with pattern-based signatures. We also tested the
negative content length vulnerability that we have discussed previously.
We designed a text-based vulnerability signature matcher for HTTP. In
addition to vulnerabilities in HTTP itself, many protocols and file formats
which are encapsulated inside of HTTP also have vulnerabilities. We use
VESPA to match the Content-Length vulnerability in CUPS/IPP, as well
as to extract the body of the message to pass it to another layer for
processing. We support standard and chunked message bodies and pass
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them to a null processing layer. Unfortunately, we were unable to make a
direct comparison to binpac for chunked HTTP messages due to a bug in
binpac’s buffering system: binpac will handle such a message but fail to
extract data from each individual chunk. Despite this, we found that
VESPA was considerably faster than the equivalent binpac parser. Since
much of the HTTP message body is ignored by both VESPA and binpac,
the throughputs we observed are very high because the size of the body
contributes to the overall number of bytes processed. We also measured the
message processing rates for various types of HTTP messages and found
them to be adequate to process the traffic of a busy web site (Figure 4.2.6c).
We implemented a binary IPP vulnerability matcher to be used in
conjunction with our HTTP parser. The VESPA IPP matcher ran four
times as fast as the binpac version, largely due to the improved state
management techniques we described earlier. We also developed a
hand-coded drop-in replacement for our binpac binary traverser of the IPP
protocol. Using this replacement, we were able to achieve an order of
magnitude improvement over the performance of the binpac binary
traversal. Therefore, our architecture stands to benefit from further
improvements of the base matching primitives of binary traversal as well.
DNS. The DNS protocol includes a compression mechanism to avoid
including a common DNS suffix more than once in the same message.
Parsing these compressed suffixes, called name pointers, is best done with a
recursive parser, but doing so introduces the possibility of a “pointer cycle,”
where a specially crafted message can force a parser to consume an infinite
amount of stack space, leading to a denial of service [59].
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DNS name pointers can occur in many different structures in DNS, so the
binary traversal must parse and visit many of the fields in the protocol.
Therefore, parsing DNS is usually much slower than other protocols.
Indeed, DNS is the worst-performing of our vulnerability signature
matchers, though it is still several times faster than binpac, as can be seen
in Figure 4.2.6. Pang et al. suggest that this is due to an inherent difficulty
of parsing DNS, pointing to the comparable performance of their
hand-implemented parser to binpac [13]. We have found this not to be the
case, as our hand-implemented DNS parser that finds pointer cycles can
operate at nearly 3 Gbps. As part of our future work, we will investigate
what part of our current design is responsible for the much worse
performance of DNS; our hope is that we will be able to achieve speeds in
excess of 1 Gbps with an automatically generated parser.
WMF. Vulnerabilities are increasingly being found in file formats (so
called “data-driven attacks”) rather than just network messages. The
WMF format allows specification of a binary “abort procedure,” called if
the rendering engine is interrupted. Attackers began to misuse this feature
in late 2005, using the abort handler for “drive-by downloads,” where an
attacker could run arbitrary code on a victim’s computer by simply
convincing them to render a WMF, requiring only a web site visit for
clients using Internet Explorer (CVE-2005-4560 [54]).
This vulnerability has been problematic for intrusion detection systems,
Snort in particular. Snort normally processes only the first few hundred
bytes of a message when looking for vulnerabilities; however, a WMF
vulnerability can be placed at the end of a very large media file. However,
matching the Snort rule set over an entire message exhausts the resources
of most intrusion detection systems, requiring most sites to resort to a
convoluted configuration with two Snort processes running in concert. Our
architecture allows for a much cleaner approach: after an HTTP header has
been parsed, the WMF vulnerability matcher would be called in the body
handler, while other string matchers and handlers would be turned off.
Figure 4.2.6 shows that WMF files can be parsed at multi-gigabit rates, so
this would not put a significant strain on the CPU resources of the NIDS.
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CHAPTER 5
SYSTEMS ISSUES
A network intrusion detection system (NIDS) has three principal modules:
• A mechanism for retrieving link-layer data from a file or network
interface, and transforming it into a format the rest of the system can
understand (which might involve TCP reassembly)
• Protocol parsers, which transform an application-layer flow into a
series of semantically rich “application events” (e.g. login, retrieving a
file, sending a message, etc.)
• A policy engine, which analyzes the event stream and looks for
abnormalities.
Our vulnerability signatures work demonstrated the redundancy of full
protocol parsing: recovering the entire application event stream is useful
only insofar as the policy engine cares about every protocol event, which it
normally does not.
Although our technique demonstrated aggressive parse speedup, we made
no attempt to study how a faster parser would affect overall system
performance. Accurately characterizing IDS performance requires carefully
considering a multitude of factors, such as the nature of the traffic
(protocols, packet sizes, fragmentation, etc.), machine characteristics
(interconnect bandwidth/latency, processor characteristics, etc.), and how
the software interacts with the hardware. Absent a thorough understanding
of how these factors interact, micro-optimizing one part of the system risks
running afoul of the cardinal principle of performance engineering: always
base optimization decisions on data.
The experiments in this chapter use the Bro IDS [19], the system
produced by the Networking Group at the International Computer Science
Institute. Recently, the group has produced a cluster- and thread-based
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version of Bro, but both are still very experimental. We present two results.
First, we found that protocol parsing does not dominate the IDS workload.
Second, we learned that on a machine with a smaller cache, per-code file
processor time and cache misses are more highly correlated than on a
machine with a larger cache, which suggests that explicit management of
the memory hierarchy must be a first-class design issue in next-generation
NIDS.
5.1 Sensitivity Analysis
As the introduction to this chapter explained, accurately characterizing IDS
performance is a high-dimension problem. In lieu of trying to infer the
entire n-dimensional performance surface of the system, another technique
is to use sensitivity analysis, which studies how the system reacts locally to
changes in a subset of its parameters.1 As shown by the vulnerability
signatures work, the variable-length, recursive binary structure of the
Domain Name System (DNS) protocol makes it especially difficult to parse,
making it an ideal candidate to (1) measure sensitivity to complexity, and
(2) establish an upper bound on the amount of time a NIDS spends parsing
protocols.
We developed a tool, dns-thrash,2 which uses a randomized traffic
model to construct syntactically valid, but hard to parse DNS traffic. A
notable feature of the tool is its ability to create deep “waterfalls” of
recursion within a DNS packet, where names recursively point to other
names with arbitrary depth (our experiments used a maximum recursion
depth of eight).
5.1.1 Variable-Length DNS Messages
This experiment was our first attempt to measure runtime sensitivity to
parse complexity.
1Many of the insights in this section resulted from two particularly good courses offered
by Profs. David Nicol and R. Srikant given over the 2008-2009 academic year at the
University of Illinois.
2Available via the author’s web site, http://davidralbrecht.com.
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The experiment used the standard (single-threaded) distribution of Bro
1.4, with debugging disabled. The traces used for each trial contained one
million UDP segments, each containing a structurally identical (yet
different) DNS message. The number of response records (RRs) in each
packet was varied from zero to eight. Each response record recursively
pointed to the record before it, giving a maximum recursion depth of eight.
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Figure 5.1: Variable-Length DNS Messages: Runtime and Throughput
Figure 5.1 shows that, as predicted, overall runtime increases with
greater packet complexity. On the other hand, it is important to note that
the DNS messages in this experiment contain progressively more data,
leading to a curious result: while runtimes increase, overall system
bandwidth actually increases as packet complexity rises, which suggests
that protocol parsing does not dominate the overall workload.
5.1.2 Constant-Length DNS Messages
Building on the results of the last experiment, we designed a second
experiment which used constant-sized DNS messages. This experiment used
a configuration identical to the first experiment, except the number of
response records was kept constant at 55 (the maximum number that would
fit into a UDP segment); we varied only the depth of the recursion used,
from one to eight.
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Figure 5.2: Constant-Length DNS Messages: Runtime and Throughput
Figure 5.2 shows a positive, but very slight, change in overall runtimes as
complexity increases. Clearly, the variable parse complexity of the DNS
packets does not dominate the workload.
5.1.3 Profiling Runs
Working from the insights gained in the DNS experiments, we dug deeper
using Shark, a sampling profiler. In a third flight of tests, we used the same
configuration as the constant-length DNS messages, while running Bro
under Shark. In the most complex configuration (55 reponse records with
eight-deep recursive nesting), we observed the binpac-based DNS parser
consuming a maximum of 16.5% of the CPU time.3 Based on this result,
and the observation that DNS is traditionally one of the most difficult
protocols to parse, we believe 16-17% CPU time constitutes a reasonable
upper bound for the time the system spends parsing protocols. After seeing
this result, it became clear that future efforts should focus on other areas of
the system than protocol parsing.
3We performed ten trials, observing similar results with each trial.
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5.1.4 Other Approaches
Dreger et al. [60] also studied resource usage of NIDS, but they focused on
system flow capacity, rather than analyzing the system’s workload. Similar
to our work, Schaelicke et al. [61] studied resource usage on a single
machine by a NIDS, but their approach assumed a single-threaded system.
“In particular,” Schaelicke notes, “processor speed is not a suitable
predictor of NIDS performance, as demonstrated by a nominally slower
Pentium-3 system outperforming a Pentium-4 system with higher clock
frequency. Memory bandwidth and latency is the most significant
contributor to the sustainable throughput.”
5.2 The Hardware Mismatch
Since its inception, the semiconductor industry has delivered greater
application performance with every product cycle. Despite sweeping
microarchitectural and process changes, the basic programming model has
not changed: a single von Neumann processor, executing instructions at
ever-greater speed, with ever-increasing amounts of memory.
Memory latency and parallelism represent two threats to the ongoing
hardware-agnosticism of software developers. While processor speeds have
scaled at near-exponential rates, memory manufacturers have failed to
deliver comparably accelerated access latencies. The widening gap between
memory and execution speeds has necessitated complex multilevel caching
strategies, which attempt to address the main memory’s inability to keep
up with the CPU’s need to load and store data [61]. In addition, hardware
parallelism represents a break in how processor performance has scaled:
instead of delivering a single, faster processor, manufacturers have turned
to many-core architectures to continue the march toward greater
instruction throughput.
Despite intense research efforts, developer tools (languages, compilers,
etc.) have yet to emerge which address these concerns, while retaining the
simplicity of today’s general-purpose, single-threaded languages. By
continuing to use design idioms and tools which assume a single-threaded,
flat-memory machine, developers risk stagnant performance even as
hardware moves forward.
41
5.2.1 Preliminary Benchmarks
Porting an existing codebase of Bro’s size to a multithreaded programming
model is quite challenging. On one hand, the developer must exercise care
to ensure data consistency; in the ideal case, several separate pieces of the
program can execute independently, with minimal interaction. In most
cases, however, synchronizing access to data structures involves locking,
which forces threads to wait when they need access to a shared resource.
Waiting on locks can cause sublinear scaling, or in some cases, even degrade
overall performance, relative to the single-threaded version of the program.
Table 5.1: Mean runtimes in seconds over ten trials, with standard deviation
in parens. Adding threads does not necessarily improve performance.
Scripts 0 1:1 1:2 1:2,3
tcp 93 (1) 77.76 (2) 67 (1) 64 (1)
mt 181 (72) 172 (58) 140 (62) 142 (44)
scan, trw 196 (94) 173 (8) 135 (5) 122 (8)
udp, icmp 1930 (48) 2946 (53) 2197 (44) 2169 (448)
http 2579 (70) 3929 (80) 2920 (54) 2600 (34)
ssh, pop3, irc, smtp 3530 (110) 5508 (122) 4028 (90) 3676 (105)
The results given in Table 5.1 were averaged over ten runs of superlinear
Bro on hatswitch, a dual-processor AMD Opteron machine with 4 GB of
RAM. Superlinear Bro always uses one “main” thread to reassemble TCP
flows but allows creating additional parser and event engine threads.
Thread configurations are specified by listing the processors (cores) on
which additional parser threads should run, then a colon, and the cores on
which event engine threads should run. In thread configuration “0”, all
tasks run in the same thread, on the same CPU.
Script complexity is cumulative; each trial adds to the complexity of the
one before it. The “tcp” script reassembles TCP flows, and logs them to a
file. The “mt” script adds analysis of several rudimentary internet services
(finger, ident, ftp, ntp, tftp, and the RPC portmapper), “scan” performs
rudimentary scan checks, and “trw” looks for scans using a more
sophisticated threshold random walk algorithm.
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5.2.2 The Memory Hierarchy
Memory bandwidth and latency are crucially important to program
performance. Traditionally, software designers left memory access decisions
up to the compiler, operating system, and hardware, but it is unclear
whether this will be possible moving forward.
We begin with an experiment showing superlinear Bro running on
rinseng, a machine with two Intel E5405 processors. The E5405 features
two pairs of two cores, with a 6 MB shared cache between each pair of
cores. The experiment measured the Bro runtime on a 700 MB trace of
enterprise traffic captured at the University of Illinois Coordinated Science
Laboratory. We measured the number of lowest-level (closest to memory)
cache accesses and misses using oprofile, and cachegrind.
Cachegrind [62], part of the Valgrind project, uses an x86 virtual machine
to simulate program execution. As it is a simulator, Cachegrind is designed
to give consistent results across multiple trials—but each trial took 10-20
times as long as a native run. Also, our experiments show that Cachegrind’s
results significantly departed from those measured on actual native runs.
Oprofile [63] works by instrumenting the Linux kernel. The tool measures
system events (cache events, machine faults, etc.) using on-die performance
counters. Oprofile gives extremely accurate results, but at the expense of
sensitivity to parameters which may be beyond the system designer’s
control (how the program interacts with libraries and the operating system,
etc.) Further, optimizing to oprofile risks over-tuning to the particular
machine architecture, in which case speedups will not readily transfer to
different architectures.
Table 5.2 compares Cachegrind to oprofile results; the experimental
configuration is the same as that in Figure 5.1. Table 5.3 gives the same
data, but in percentage form.
With further study and analysis, we determined that the observed
disparity between oprofile and Cachegrind was attributable largely to
thread scheduling. Cachegrind simulates multi-threaded programs using
very fine interleaving, and does not account for the differences in machines
with shared vs. split caches, instruction interleaving from multiple cores, or
cache misses not visible at the instruction level (e.g. translation lookaside
misses).
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Table 5.2: Cachegrind vs. oprofile L2 results. Results mostly agree, but
differ markedly on the 1:1 and 1:2,3 trials.
Scripts Threads cg L2 refs cg l2 misses op L2 refs op L2 misses
tcp 0 92.8 M 116 K 86.31 M 390 K
1:1 75 M 1.18 M 42.98 M 0.95 M
1:2 78.3 M 213 K 74 M 5.72 M
1:2,3 77.92 M 206 K 85 M 12 M
tcp, mt 0 171.8 M 292 K 166.5 M 730 K
1:1 133 M 3.4 M 69.4 M 1.83 M
1:2 130.8 M 3.5 M 130 M 7.50 M
1:2,3 132 M 5.12 M 152 M 19.89 M
tcp, mt, scan, trw 0 92.8 M 116 K 86.31 M 390 K
Table 5.3: Cachegrind vs. op L2 miss %.
Configuration thread conf cg L2 miss % op l2 miss %
tcp 0 1.25 0.45
1:1 1.57 2.21
1:2 0.27 7.72
1:2,3 0.26 14.12
tcp, mt 0 0.17 0.43
1:1 2.55 2.63
1:2 2.68 5.76
1:2,3 3.88 13.09
tcp, mt, scan, trw 0 0.13 0.45
For our final experiment, we sought to determine whether adding a larger
cache would mitigate the effects of misses on runtime. We used the same
experiment design as the prior L2 miss study, and set oprofile to measure
(1) L2 misses, and (2) time samples, over every file in the entire Bro
superlinear codebase. We treated these two quantities (time and misses) as
two random variables, and calculated their correlations over two machines
(specify machine configurations).
Our results are very preliminary; however, using a scheme for statically
mapping flows to CPUs (based on a hash of the connection key), we found
correlations of ρ = 0.6081 on hatswitch4, and ρ = 0.4926 on rinseng5.
Likewise, using round-robin hashing, we found the time/L2 correlation to
be ρ = 0.7713 on hatswitch, and ρ = 0.5067 on rinseng. These results
4A dual-processor, four core AMD Opteron machine with 4GB RAM.
5A dual-processor Intel Xeon E5405 machine with 32 GB RAM.
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should not be treated as definitive, as we held the type of traffic constant,
and instrumented only at the granularity of code files (not individual
instructions). However, we do feel these results support further inquiry into
the relationship between cache behavior and runtime performance.
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CHAPTER 6
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
This section outlines the architecture of an envisioned next-generation
intrusion-detection system, and identifies problems for further study.
6.1 Future Architecture
Over the course of our work, it became clear that fine-grained
object-orientation is not appropriate for bulk packet processors. Bro, in
particular, creates a new object corresponding to every stack frame in its
interpreted policy language. Additionally, a major source of speedup in
VESPA is its avoidance of object creation and deletion overhead. In our
DNS experiments, we noticed Bro spending more than 25% of total CPU
time in object constructors and destructors.1
Further, we believe that a next-generaion IDS must address the two
major hardware challenges identified in the last section: (1) the proliferation
of multicore processors, and (2) the growing cost of moving data to and
from main memory. Future IDS designs, therefore, will require fine-grained
threading, and explicit management of how data moves through the system.
These two concerns must be addressed simultaneously; addressing locality
requires knowledge of when data-dependent code executes. The eventual
result will require a coordinated effort between operating system designers
(locality-aware algorithms for thread and process scheduling), processor
architects (cache and memory design), compiler authors (to provide the
right abstractions for this new programming model), and software
engineers, who will need to learn to program a machine radically different
from the traditional, single-threaded, flat-memory model machine offered
1This figure includes malloc() and free() calls, but even still, we believe it is unreason-
ably high.
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by the C programming language (and its descendants).
Stream processing is a step in the right direction. Projects such as the
Click Modular Router [64], MIT Streamit [65], and IBM’s System S
initiative approach computation as a “software pipeline,” where the
workload is decomposed into a number of small, simple functional kernels.
Data flows into the pipeline where it is operated on and transformed by the
functional kernels, and eventually is logged or discarded at the end of the
pipeline. Ideally, a streaming system’s functional kernels map nicely onto
operating system threads, exposing as much concurrency to the hardware
as it can handle. Additionally, constraining how data moves through the
system allows optimizing how the kernels are arranged on the processor,
and how data moves from memory into the cache hierarchy.
Constructing a streaming NIDS would require a lot more work. For one,
streaming systems assume a predictable flow of data through the
inter-kernel communication channels, which is hardly the case with bursty
network packets. Additionally, the stages of an IDS pipeline are far from a
streaming system’s “computation kernels”; they are functional units, many
of which require session state tracking. Nevertheless, the potential for
compiler-guided data flow management (including when and how threads
are scheduled to execute) seems too huge to ignore.
6.2 Other Concerns
This section explains some of the challenges encountered in the course of
this work. In the author’s opinion, any of these would make a great topic
for future research.
The need for data. A persistent problem in networking research is the
lack of real-world data for experimentation. Header-only traces are
available, but in general, privacy policies bar system administrators from
recording traces, even for research purposes.
The security community has extensively studied trace anonymization, in
hope of striking some balance between users’ right to privacy, and the need
for legitimate scientific research to advance the state of the art. The
University of Illinois’ excellent IT department, CITES (Campus
Information Technologies and Educational Services), described a past
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project to set up a “vault,” where researchers could perform experiments,
but were limited in what they could remove from the system after their
work.2 With well-articulated policies and good enforcement, such a “data
vault” could offer a fair middle ground between users and researchers.
Mapping a sequential workload onto parallel hardware. The
parallelism movement in computer architecture is actively studying this
problem, but security presents its own challenges. Load-balancing schemes
must be robust against resource depletion attacks. Also, determining how
to prevent resource starvation by attackers in multi-threaded code generally
will become important as more code is parallelized.
Ambient authority. n-tier applications, such as database-backed web
sites, are riddled with ambient authority. Database administrators
routinely bypass database security by using superuser accounts for daily
operation. Many web attacks, such as SQL injection, would be much harder
if existing protection mechanisms (operating system security, database
security, etc.) used n-tier application principals directly, rather than relying
on application semantics to regulate user capabilities.
Where to place the NIDS. Many NIDS designers assume a single
ingress/egress point for organizational Internet traffic, but this is
increasingly not the case with personal VPN connections, single-site
multihoming, and wide-area organizational intranets. In the past, sensors
have been placed at Internet connection points, inside intranet
infrastructure (e.g. LAN switches), and directly on user machines. A
thorough study of the costs and benefits of each approach would be useful.
Design for parseability. When protocols like DNS were designed,
computers were fast relative to their network interconnects; today, the
situation is reversed. Even given today’s extremely verbose protocols (such
as XML), high-end servers struggle to keep pace with incoming traffic
streams. To date, there has been no explicit study of how to design a
protocol for high-performance parsing.
Special-purpose hardware. Although research IDS efforts focus on
software systems, high-performance networking vendors such as Cisco and
TippingPoint make extensive use of custom hardware. Custom hardware
has been studied piecemeal, with some limited systems work (see Chapter
2Josh Stone, Mike Corn, and Roy Campbell worked on this initiative.
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2), but further research could explore programming paradigms and tools for
these relatively heterogeneous (or customized) platforms.
Forensic studies of intrusion. Over the course of this work, we came
to believe that many security vulnerabilities were due to misconfiguration
and operator error, not software defects per se. A study examining how
real-word intrusions happened in the past could be invaluable for focusing
future research efforts, as well as directing organizational resources to the
highest-value uses, in terms of keeping intruders out.
What to do when misuse is detected? The standard action is a
connection reset, followed by the insertion of a firewall rule which blocks
further communication from the offending host. However, the author
believes systems could go further, perhaps contributing to a distributed
threat monitoring system.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
The state of the art in intrusion detection is inadequate. Signatures are too
difficult to construct, evasion is too easy, and parsers cannot keep up with
today’s data rates. We wanted to understand what design choices would be
necessary to enable rich semantic analysis (which hardens the system
against evasion) at wire speed.
We began by studying protocol parsing, which required a thorough study
of the protocols themselves. We discovered that, despite the diversity of
protocols on the Internet, designers followed consistent idioms when
constructing protocols. These idioms were influenced by hardware
architectures, programming languages, and economic factors (e.g. the
relative cost of bandwidth vs. compute time). Defects—whether in the
protocols themselves, or in the way that software handles the
protocols—give rise to exploits. Network protocol characteristics strongly
influence what kind of exploits are available against a piece of
network-facing software.
Once we familiarized ourselves with protocols, we turned our attention to
protocol parsing. Parsing, in general, is well-studied in the computer
science literature. Unfortunately, many of the traditional insights the
literature offers (such as complexity classes) are not applicable to
high-speed intrusion detection, a topic which leans heavily on how
algorithms are implemented in hardware.
We studied the Bro Intrusion Detection System and found that binpac,
Bro’s protocol parser, parsed the entire application protocol exchange,
regardless of whether the events were important to the policy engine.
VESPA, our parser architecture, trades off hand-coded signatures for more
than an order of magnitude speedup in protocol parsing. We attribute
VESPA’s gains to (1) its use of a flat, procedural data model (versus
binpac’s nested objects), and (2) eliminating redundant parsing by
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combining policy and parsing into a single module. VESPA’s chief
drawback is its difficulty of use; it required hand-coded signatures for each
protocol/policy combination. However, we feel a valuable contribution has
been made in identifying the potential for speedup using a different
approach.
Beyond parsing, we noticed that both Bro and Snort—the two major
research IDSes—expressed their application code in a flat, monolithic
programming model. That model is not well-aligned with future trends in
computer architecture, which suggests that it is time to rethink how
intrusion detection systems are designed. The well-exposed parallelism and
explicit dataflow modeling of streaming systems offers the potential to
better utilize next-generation hardware, by letting the compiler make
decisions about how the application should interact with the hardware.
Although we would have liked to implement a next-generation IDS, doing
so was not within the scope of a master’s project. We encourage further
research to complete what we have left undone.
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